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Digital sovereignty: your servers don't travel, your employees do

Customs, remote work abroad, subcontractors: what matters isn't where your data sleeps, but who can open it, from where, and on whose orders.

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TL;DR

Hosting your data in Quebec is a good start, not a guarantee. Digital sovereignty comes down to three questions, in this order: who can be compelled to hand over your data, who holds the keys and the access, and only then where the servers sleep.

Your servers don't travel. Your people do. The laptop going through US customs, the employee working from Florida for two months, the IT provider connecting remotely with a foreign tool: each one carries your data across a border without any hosting contract noticing.

Law 25 requires a privacy impact assessment before you communicate personal information outside Quebec, or entrust someone outside Quebec with processing it. This post gives you the questions to ask your team and your providers to find out where you stand.



In this article

Monday morning, the controller of a Granby SMB drives through the Lacolle border crossing with her work laptop. She's heading to Fort Lauderdale for six weeks of remote work. The company's server is in Montreal, with a Quebec hosting provider. Everyone at the office is convinced the data "stays in Quebec."

Except that on this laptop sit her mailbox cache, a synced folder with the year's financial statements, and a password manager left unlocked since the coffee stop at the gas station. The officer asking for her passcode isn't looking at the Montreal server, but at what's on the device.

That gap is what this post wants to name. We talk a lot about digital sovereignty in terms of data centres. We talk much less about it in terms of people, devices and access, even though that's how data crosses borders every single day.


Three questions that come before the server's address

When an organization says "our data is hosted in Canada," it's answering the easiest question. The other two matter more.

The question What it checks Example of a wrong answer
1. Who can be compelled? The laws that apply to every company that touches your data, no matter where it stores it. A Toronto data centre owned by an American company.
2. Who holds the keys and the access? Admin accounts, encryption keys, the domain name, the remote control tool. A local host whose overnight support is handled from another continent.
3. Where is the data, physically? The country of the servers, but also that of the copies: laptops, phones, backups. A server in Quebec and a full copy on the laptop of a travelling employee.

A truly sovereign organization can answer all three. Most SMBs can only answer the third, and only for their main server.


Does this really apply to you?

Before going further, four yes-or-no questions:

  1. Does an employee ever cross a border with a computer or phone that gives access to your files?
  2. Does anyone work remotely from outside Quebec, even for just a few weeks a year?
  3. Does an outside provider (IT, accounting, software) have remote access to your systems?
  4. Does your data include personal information about clients, members, employees or volunteers?

If you answered no across the board, the border question boils down to choosing your host. Our post on the Cloud Act and foreign interference covers that ground. If you answered yes to at least one, what follows concerns you directly.


A Montreal data centre doesn't change its owner's nationality

The US CLOUD Act requires a provider subject to US law to hand over the data it controls, "regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States." The server's address isn't part of the test. The test is who controls the data.

Microsoft France admitted as much under oath. On June 10, 2025, before an inquiry committee of the French Senate, its director of public and legal affairs was asked whether the company could guarantee that French citizens' data would never be handed over following an order from the US government. His answer, as recorded in the transcript: "No, I cannot guarantee it, but, again, it has never happened yet." A little earlier in the same hearing: "When we are obliged to hand them over, we hand them over." (our translation)

There's a second, lesser-known nuance. Even when data stays in a given region, the people who maintain it aren't necessarily there. Microsoft's documentation on its "EU Data Boundary" states in black and white that, in rare cases of outage or repair, authorized personnel may access data stored in the EU remotely, and that some support cases are handled from locations outside the EU. The data doesn't move. The hands touching it do.

We've already covered the legal side in our post on sovereignty and resilience, and the availability side in the day the American cloud closes. Here, we're looking at what happens outside the data centre.


The laptop going through customs

In fiscal year 2025 (October 2024 to September 2025), US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) searched the electronic devices of 55,318 travellers, a record. That's 17.6% more than the year before. The first three quarters of fiscal 2026 published on its website already add up to 52,081 searches. Measured against the number of travellers, it's still rare: less than 0.01% of arrivals. But for an SMB that sends people to the United States every month, rare doesn't mean never.

The rules CBP publishes say three things that matter to a business owner:

  • A "basic" search, done by hand by the officer, requires no suspicion at all. It accounts for 92% of searches. An "advanced" search, where the officer plugs in equipment to copy or analyze the contents, requires reasonable suspicion or a national security concern.
  • The officer disconnects network access before searching, and can't use the device to look up information stored only remotely. What gets examined is what resides on the device.
  • A device that can't be inspected may be detained. For a traveller who isn't a US citizen, the inability to inspect the device can factor into the decision to admit them or not.

Coming home, the logic is similar on the Canadian side. The Canada Border Services Agency says it examines a device when there are indications that a border law may have been broken, that it puts the device in airplane mode to examine only what's stored on it, and that a traveller must provide their password on request. Refusing can lead to the device being detained.

The practical consequence is counterintuitive. The more local copies a device keeps (cached email, folders synced for offline use, downloaded attachments), the more data it carries across. A laptop that only opens web applications, keeping nothing on the disk, has next to nothing to show. The sovereignty of a business trip is decided when you prepare the device, not when you choose the host. Our post on cybersecurity while travelling gives you the basic checklist.


Remote work doesn't stop at the border

The Granby controller's case is nothing exotic. Some employees spend the winter down south, others visit family in Europe for a month and keep working. Meanwhile, the screen displays client files in another country, on a home or hotel network nobody at the office has ever seen.

Law 25 clearly covers two situations. Before communicating personal information outside Quebec, or entrusting a person or body outside Quebec with collecting, using, communicating or keeping it on its behalf, a business must carry out a privacy impact assessment. That assessment takes into account, among other things, how sensitive the information is and the legal framework of the place it would go.

An employee opening a file from Florida isn't a third party. But we found no position from the Commission d'accès à l'information that settles this exact case. What the law doesn't spell out, your remote work policy has to. Three decisions are enough for most SMBs:

  • Which categories of files can be opened from abroad, and which never.
  • On which device: the company's encrypted one, or any device at all.
  • With or without a local copy.

The tools know how to enforce these decisions: browser access with no downloads, blocking connections from certain countries, sessions that close on their own. But someone has to make the decision before the tool can enforce it.


Your subcontractor has the keys, and so does theirs

Most SMBs hand their IT to an outside provider. To do the work, that provider installs a remote management agent on every workstation. By design, that agent has full control over the computer. It's almost always published by a foreign company, and it answers to a console you never see.

On July 2, 2021, attackers hijacked the Kaseya VSA remote management tool to push ransomware through the providers who used it. According to Kaseya, fewer than 60 of its direct customers were hit, but up to 1,500 businesses downstream. Most of those businesses had never heard the name Kaseya. They simply had an IT provider.

The most telling example, though, comes from the top of the chain. In July 2025, ProPublica revealed that for nearly ten years, China-based Microsoft engineers had been helping maintain cloud systems for the US Department of Defense. American "digital escorts," holding a security clearance but often less expert than the engineers they were supervising, copied their commands into the systems. The data was indeed hosted in the United States, in a government cloud. The Pentagon ended the practice in August 2025.

The lesson for an SMB: where the data sits says nothing about where the hands are. And Law 25 is clear on this point: entrusting the processing of personal information to someone outside Quebec requires the assessment set out in section 17, and any mandate given to a provider must be in writing, with the protection measures it must take.

Five questions to send your IT provider this week. The answers fit on one page.

  1. From which countries can your technicians, including on-call staff and your subcontractors, connect to our systems?
  2. Which tools have admin access to our workstations and servers, and who publishes them?
  3. Who do you, in turn, hand part of our service to (overnight support, backups, monitoring)?
  4. Who holds the encryption keys to our backups, and can you read them without us?
  5. Does our written agreement specify the protection measures and incident notification, as Law 25 requires?


Who holds the keys, literally

Encryption is often presented as the answer to everything. It protects very well against a thief. It doesn't protect against an order served on whoever holds the key. If your provider can decrypt your data to help you out, it can also decrypt it when it's forced to. The difference between the two comes down to a single question: who keeps the key.

Three other "keys" often fly under the radar:

  • The domain name. Whoever controls the registrar account can redirect your email and your website in minutes. It must be in the organization's name, not a former employee's or a provider's.
  • The main admin account. The account that can reset everything must belong to the organization and be protected by two-factor authentication that you control.
  • The identity service. If every login goes through a single foreign identity provider, that provider has the final say on who gets in.


The blind spots of sovereignty

Hosting in Quebec with a Quebec company solves a lot. Not everything.

Canadian laws apply too. A Quebec host can receive an order from a Canadian court, and lawful access powers keep evolving, as we saw with Bill C-2. Sovereignty doesn't mean the absence of law; it means the applicable law is one you know and can defend yourself against.

A local provider may itself depend on foreign players. Its support, its tools, its backups or its own hosting may go through a company subject to another jurisdiction. Hence question 3 in the box above.

Total sovereignty doesn't exist. Processors, firmware, operating systems and their updates come from elsewhere. The realistic goal isn't to make everything in-house, it's to know who can do what and to be able to switch providers without losing everything.

Finally, it takes time. A remote work policy, a prepared travel device, an access inventory: none of this is software you buy. It's a person who takes care of it and keeps the inventory up to date when someone joins or leaves.


At Blue Fox

We rarely start with the server. We start with an inventory of the people and providers who can open your data, where they do it from, with which tool, and who holds the keys. That inventory then becomes the basis for the privacy impact assessment Law 25 requires, and for a remote work and travel policy your employees can actually follow.

For hosting, our approach stays the same: free and open source tools, hosted in Quebec, with keys and admin accounts that belong to the client organization. That doesn't solve everything, as we've just seen. It solves the first question in the table, and it makes the other two much easier to answer.

Let's talk about who really holds your keys.


Sources

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